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CHAPTER 5 
Torts 
ROBERT J. SHERER 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§5.1. Status of injured party. In most cases involving so-called 
"passive torts,"l a critical question is the status of the person injured 
at the precise place of his injury. The status of the plaintiff, of course, 
determines the extent of the duty owed him by the defendant. In two 
cases decided during the 1965 SURVEY year, a plaintiff's case failed 
because he apparently strayed beyond the limits of the invitation 
extended to him to use the defendant's premises. 
Cronin v. Universal Carloading and Distributing CO.2 was a suit by 
a truck driver against the owner and the lessor of a freight house to 
which he was making a delivery when injured in a fall. The evidence 
was that the plaintiff's injury occurred when the rung of a ladder he 
was climbing gave way, causing him to fall. The ladder, as the Court 
pointed out, "is not very adequately described in the record, which 
affords little assistance in determining to what extent its use by visitors 
was reasonably contemplated."B For this reason and because the 
presence of proper stairs elsewhere indicated that they, rather than 
the ladder, were intended as the means of access to the building, the 
Court concluded that the lessee in control of the premises "did not 
owe Cronin, with respect to any part of the yard as to which the in-
vitation did not reasonably extend, the duty of care which it would 
owe to an invitee.". 
That the burden of proving his right to be where he was at the 
time of his injury rests on the injured plaintiff was further brought 
home by Paquette v. Bradley.1i The plaintiff, a patron of the defendant's 
diner, was injured when, on leaving the diner, he leaned over a hand-
rail on the outer platform to see where his companion was parked. The 
rail collapsed, he fell, and was injured. After concluding that directing 
a verdict for the defendant was proper because there was no evidence 
of what caused the rail to collapse or that there was any defect in the 
ROBERT J. SHERER is a member of the firm of Roche and Leen, Boston. 
§5.1. 1 This expression is the author's own and is used to distinguish cases in-
volving liability for the condition of premises or ways as opposed to such "active 
torts" as operation of vehicles, libel, slander, etc. 
21965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 411, 204 N.E.2d 917, also noted in §2.7 supra. 
BId. at 416, 204 N.E.2d at 921. 
4 Ibid. 
Ii 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 47, 203 N.E.2d 555. 
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premises of which the defendant should have known, it may have been 
superfluous, but Mr. Justice Reardon thought it worthwhile to add 
"There is nothing to indicate that the invitation to the plaintiff was 
sufficiently comprehensive to entitle him to rely upon the strength of 
the railing in the event he chose to lean on it."6 
In view of the Court's other conclusions concerning the absence of 
evidence of negligence, nothing turned on the plaintiff's status in 
Paquette. In Tomaino v. Newman,7 however, the status of the plain-
tiff was decisive. The plaintiff was a guest passenger in the defendant's 
vehicle which got stuck in the sand of an unpaved street. The plain-
tiff, who had gone out to the main highway to seek help, was asked 
by the defendant to return to the car to see if her help was needed if 
he could not get the car started. The defendant then tried to start the 
car by placing a plank under each wheel. He started without warning 
and one of the planks flew back and struck the plaintiff. In sustaining 
exceptions to a directed verdict for the defendant, the Court ruled 
that, from the fact of the defendant's invitation to the plaintiff to 
return in order to help him, "the jury could have concluded that the 
plaintiff was conferring a benefit in the performance of something in 
which the defendant had an interest,"S and thus became an invitee 
rather than a mere social guest. The difference was critical, since the 
evidence of negligence was described as "ample,"9 although no evi-
dence of gross negligence was found. 
A similar conversion in status was decisive in Mikaloros v. Stama-
touras.10 The plaintiff had come to a house owned by the defendant 
to visit a tenant's wife. During the course of her visit, she went up-
stairs to visit the defendant's mother-in-law in the second floor apart-
ment. While returning to the first floor apartment, she missed a step 
in an unlighted (at the time) hallway, fell, and was injured. As a social 
guest of the defendant, the plaintiff could not recover except for gross 
negligence. The Court, however, ruled that the plaintiff had resumed 
her status of a guest of the tenant and, therefore, stood in the shoes of 
the tenant and could recover for the ordinary negligence of failing to 
light a common passageway which the defendant had undertaken to 
keep lighted. 
§5.2. Causal connection between injury and condition. It is, of 
course, hornbook tort law that a breach of duty which causes no in-
jury is not actionable.1 The case of Weinberg v. Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority2 indicates that a plaintiff must prove that 
his injuries are the result of the defendant's conduct by some means 
6Id. at 49, 203 N.E.2d at 556. 
71965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 173, 204 N.E.2d 126. 
sId. at 175·176, 204 N.E.2d at 128. 
BId. at 175, 204 N.E.2d at 128. 
101965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 481, 206 N.E.2d 62, also noted in §2.7 supra. 
§5.2. 1 Sullivan v. Old Colony Street Railway Co., 200 Mass. 303, 86 N.E. 511 
(1908). 
21965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 437, 205 N.E.2d 5. 
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other than application of post hoc ergo propter hoc. The plaintiff, who 
was injured while a passenger of the defendant's predecessor-in-in-
terest, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, was permitted to testify, 
without objection or limitation, that at the time of the trial (seven 
years after the accident) she had pain on the side of her leg, got out 
of breath if she walked up six steps, and that her varicose veins "got 
bad" three years after the accident. Although all of this evidence was 
admitted, as noted, without objection or limitation, the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that it was error to refuse an instruction requested 
by the defendant that "the causal relation between the plaintiff's in-
jury on June 15, 1955, and the incapacity which the plaintiff alleges 
still existed as of ... this trial is a matter beyond the common knowl-
edge of the jury and must be established by expert medical testi-
mony."8 A new trial limited to the issue of damages was ordered 
because "whether a fracture of the ankle could give rise to such con-
sequences . . . as varicose veins and shortness of breath cannot be said 
to be a matter of common knowledge." 
The requested instruction would, in effect, direct the jury to dis-
regard, on the question of damages, evidence which they had already 
heard without limitation or objection. If the Court was at all troubled 
by this apparent waiver, the opinion does not show it. The rule ap-
plied here is akin to treatment of the parol evidence rule whereby 
evidence tending to vary the written contract is not admissible but, 
if admitted, proves nothing.· 
§5.3. Libel and slander. A former assistant psychiatric social 
worker at the Boston State Hospital brought an action for libel and 
slander against the superintendent who had discharged him.l The pub-
lications referred to were two letters, one recommending dismissal and 
the other discharging the plaintiff, and an entry in the plaintiff's 
personnel record. An auditor and a jury found for the defendant, who 
testified that his action in dismissing the plaintiff was based in part 
on reports he had received from a subordinate. The auditor found 
that the defendant had no reasonable grounds to believe the matters 
contained in the letters. The plaintiff requested an instruction that, 
in order to find that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe 
what he had written about the plaintiff, he must have known it of 
his own knowledge or had it communicated to him prior to the date 
of publication.2 The instruction was refused and exceptions taken to 
the refusal to so instruct. 
Before the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant argued that, as 
8Id. at 4!l8, 205 N.E.2d at 6. 
4, Dekofski v. Leite, !l!l6 Mass. 127, 1!l0, 142 N.E.2d 782, 784 (1957), and cases cited 
therein. 
§5.!l. 1 Vigoda v. Barton, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 22!l, 204 N.E.2d 441. The same case 
was before the Court earlier on demurrer in !l!l8 Mass. !l02, 155 N.E.2d 409 (1959), 
and the same matter was also the subject of a mandamus proceeding. Vigoda v. 
Superintendent of Boston State Hospital, !l!l6 Mass. 724, 147 N.E.2d 794 (1958). 
21965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 22!l, 227, 204 N.E.2d 441, 445. 
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an executive official of the Commonwealth, his official statements 
should be absolutely privileged as are the statements of federal of-
ficials.s The Court, however, found it unnecessary to go that far. 
Speaking through Mr. Justice Reardon, the Court stated: 
We are of opinion that the defendant in any event had a con-
ditional privilege sufficient to protect him from liability. We hold 
that a finding of lack of reasonable grounds to believe the matter 
communicated by an executive official does not result in the loss 
of his conditional privilege.4 
The decision indicates a tendency to follow the federal policy that 
public officials should be left free to do their jobs rather than spend 
their time defending themselves against libel and slander suits.5 The 
Court's reference to the "considerable influence" exercised by the 
reasoning in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan6 indicates that the dis-
senting views expressed by Justices Cutter and Spalding in Twohig 
v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corporation7 (delivered prior to the Sul-
livan case) may yet prevail where criticism of public officials is in· 
volved.s 
The problems of Edward M. Joyce were before the courts again in 
Joyce v. George W. Prescott Publishing CO.,9 an action of tort for libel. 
The alleged libel was the defendant's reference to the plaintiff's 
admission to a state hospital as a "commitment." Reversing a verdict 
for the plaintiff and ordering a directed verdict for the defendant, the 
Supreme Judicial Court, in a rescript without opinion, pointed out 
that everyone concerned with the proceedings in question termed them 
a "commitment" and that the defendant did no more than make an 
accurate report of a judicial proceeding. 
A different consideration was involved in Perry v. Hearst Corp.,10 
however. Under a headline "MAY EXHUME 2 IN CAPE MYS-
TER Y," the defendant reported that officials in the hospital in which 
the plaintiff's husband died suspected that he was suffering from 
chronic arsenic poisoning, that the husband's brother, who spent two 
days "here" during the former's funeral, died a month later and that 
the plaintiff's mother, who had come to live with her after the 
husband's death, died two months later and was cremated. In reversing 
a judgment dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim, the 
Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Aldrich, declared: 
s Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 Sup. Ct. 1335, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1434 (1959). 
41965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 223, 228-229, 204 N.E.2d 441, 445. 
5 See the discussion of Denman v. White, 316 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1963), in 1963 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §3.3 at 44. 
6376 U.S. 254, 84 Sup. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964). 
7346 Mass. 654, 656, 195 N.E.2d 320, 322 (1964). 
s See discussion in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.3. 
91965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 470, 205 N.E.2d 207. For other litigation involving the same 
plaintiff, see Joyce v. Ferrazzi, 323 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1963); joyce v. Hickey, 337 Mass. 
U8, 147 N.E.2d 187 (1958). 
10334 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1964). 
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The defendant, having chosen to make a story out of this, is in 
a poor position to say there was none .... Taking the article as 
a whole, we believe it would be only natural for even reasonable 
readers . . . to assume that they were being furnished with some-
thing more than necrology or trivia concerning the relict of a 
routinely posted cadaver, and that they could well conclude that 
the plaintiff was suspected of having engaged in highly sinister 
conduct.n 
Citing Mabardi v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp.,12 the Court re-
affirmed the Massachusetts standard that whether a publication is 
defamatory depends upon how it might be understood not by "wise, 
thoughtful and tolerant men, nor by ordinarily reasonable men, but by 
any 'considerable and respectable class in the community.' "13 
§5.4. Duty to warn: Products liability. Three cases decided dur-
ing the 1965 SURVEY year involved the intertwined questions of (a) 
the duty to give a warning on the part of a defendant, (b) the necessity 
to give a warning to the plaintiff, and (c) the adequacy of a warning 
actually given. 
Carney v. Bereault1 involved the duty of a defendant to give a warn-
ing. An oil company owned a garage which it leased to an operator. 
Part of the equipment included in the lease was a hydraulic lift or 
hoist. The plaintiff, a business invitee, was injured when a car owned 
by another rolled off the hoist and struck him. An action of tort was 
brought against the oil company, the garage operator, the manu-
facturer of the hoist, and the owner of the car. A jury found for the 
plaintiff against the operator, and verdicts were directed in favor of 
the other defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, although 
it divided (the lone dissenter was not identified) as to the liability 
of the oil company. The evidence that the oil company, which had by 
its lease to the operator surrendered all control of the premises and 
disclaimed any right to control operations, regularly sent its service-
men to the station to repair equipment, was held not to impose any 
duty upon the oil company to warn of the dangerous condition of the 
hoist. The majority's view was that these repairs were not shown to 
have been made "other than gratuitously" and the plaintiff, as invitee 
of the tenant, could have no greater rights against the landlord than 
did the tenant. 
The result reached by the majority is in accord with the decided 
cases if the relationship between the parties (i.e., the oil company 
and the operator) be viewed as the ordinary landlord and tenant re-
lationship. It is, however, not at all clear that this was the extent of 
the relationship. It is a matter of common knowledge that most service 
stations such as that involved in this action operate under the aegis of 
11 Id. at 802. 
12347 Mass. 411, 198 N.E.2d 304 (1964). See 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §!UI. 
13 334 F.2d 800, 802 (1st Cir. 1964). 
§5.4. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257, 204 N.E.2d 448, also noted in §2.6 supra. 
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a chain oil company, displaying the trademark of the oil company, 
which spends great sums of money in advertising to attract customers 
to stations displaying its trademark. Unlike the usual customer who 
deals with a person doing business from leased premises, the customer 
of a gasoline station has entered on the invitation not only of the 
lessee operator but also of the lessor oil company. The latter has a 
direct interest in the operation of the business on the demised premises 
in its name.2 Under these circumstances, its undertaking to make 
repairs cannot, as a matter of law, be characterized as "gratuitous." 
It is unfortunate that the dissenting justice did not feel inclined 
to express his views in a separate opinion. 
New York Central Railroad Co. v. Moynihan8 examined the duty-
to-warn problem from the plaintiff's point of view. The plaintiff, an 
employee of a public weigher, was injured when struck by a falling 
skid which had been left standing on edge against the wall of a shed 
on a pier. A verdict in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant 
lessee of the pier was reversed by the Court of Appeals which ruled 
that the railroad had no duty to warn the plaintiff of a danger which, 
on his own evidence, was obvious to him. 
Hubbard-Hall Chemical Co. v. Silverman4 involved the adequacy 
of a warning given. The plaintiffs' intestates, who were migrant Puerto 
Rican farm laborers, died after inhaling a poisonous insecticide, manu-
factured by the defendant, which they had been spraying on the 
plants of the field. The container in which the insecticide was kept 
carried on its label a rather detailed warning of the poisonous nature 
of its contents and instructions for protecting the users thereof. Never-
theless, a verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 
Judge Wyzanski expressed the opinion of the Court: 
that the jury could reasonably have believed that defendant 
should have foreseen that its admittedly dangerous product 
would be used by ... persons ... of limited education and reading 
ability, and that a warning ... would not, because of its lack of a 
skull and bones or other comparable symbols or hieroglyphics, be 
"adequate instructions or warnings of its . . . dangerous con-
dition."5 
While the decision purports to be an application of Massachusetts 
law to a diversity case,6 it seems to go farther than the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts has ever cared to go in a products 
liability case. The Massachusetts Court has consistently denied re-
covery in cases in which a plaintiff failed to follow the manufacturer's 
instructions printed on a container.7 It is also doubtful that the 
2 See, for example, the relationship described in Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 93 
F.2d 870, 116 A.L.R. 449 (4th Cir. 1938). 
8338 F.2d 644 (1st Cir. 1964). 
4340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965). 
5Id. at 405. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Vincent v. Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 151 N.E.2d 263 (1958). 
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Massachusetts Court would require a manufacturer to foresee that his 
product would be used by someone unable to read the rather detailed 
warnings on the container and to require him to take precautions 
against such a circumstance. 
§5.5. Snow and ice. Sixty-Eight Devonshire, Inc. v. Shapiro l was 
an action by the owner of a building to recover for damages caused 
to his building by water discharged onto it as the result of a broken 
downspout on the adjoining building belonging to the defendant. A 
verdict was directed for the defendant on the plaintiff's opening. Be· 
fore the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant attempted to defend 
the trial judge's action on the basis of the absence of the notice reo 
quired by General Laws, Chapter 84, Section 21.2 The plaintiff, in its 
opening, had offered to show that, during the winter, the water pour-
ing onto the front of the building froze, causing icicles to form. The 
Court, however, observed that the defective condition of the defend-
ant's premises, to which the statute refers, was a broken downspout, 
and that no formation of ice on the defendant's premises caused in-
jury to the plaintiff. The result reached made it unnecessary for the 
Court to consider the plaintiff's argument that Section 21 applies only 
to personal injury cases and not to property damage.8 
§5.6. Sovereign immunity. Kurtigian v. City of Worcesterl was an 
action of tort based upon negligence and the maintenance of a nui-
sance. The plaintiff, while working in his own yard, was injured when 
struck by a limb blown from a tree on the adjoining premises. The 
city of Worcester had taken the adjoining premises for nonpayment of 
taxes. On appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on an 
auditor's report, the city argued, inter alia, that its title was incident 
to its governmental function of collecting taxes and, hence, it could 
not be held liable in tort. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected this 
argument, however, holding that the city's liability, as the owner of 
real estate, for a private nuisance is the same as that of a natural 
person.2 Chief Justice Wilkins summed up the Court's feeling as fol-
lows: 
§5.5. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. U1l7, 202 N.E.2d Sll. 
2 This section provides, in pertinent part: "The three preceding sections, so far as 
they relate to notices of injuries resulting from snow or ice, shall apply to actions 
against persons founded upon the defective condition of their premises, or of adjoin-
ing ways, when caused by or consisting in part of snow or ice resulting from rain 
or snow and weather conditions; provided that notice within thirty days after the 
injury shall be sufficient .•.• " (Emphasis added.) The italicized words were inserted 
in the section by Acts of 1955, c. 505, but were not material to the present case. 
S There would appear to be some merit to the plaintiff's argument. While Sec-
tion 17 refers to nonliability of a municipality for "injury or damage" and Section IS 
to a notice of "the time, place, and cause of said injury or damage," the latter 
section begins by speaking of "a person so injured"; Section 19 refers to a notice 
signed "by the person injured"; Section 20, "the name and place of residence of the 
person injured." Section 21 also refers to "notices of injuries," "the injured person," 
and notice "within thirty days after the injury." 
§5.6. 1 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. I, 2011 N.E.2d 692. 
2Id. at 4, 2011 N.E.2d at 694. 
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Public policy in a civilized community requires that there be 
someone to be held responsible for a private nuisance on each 
piece of real estate, and, particularly in an urban area, that there 
be no oases of nonliability where a private nuisance may be 
maintained with impunity.8 
General Laws, Chapter 92, Section 35, authorizes the Metropolitan 
District Commission to construct roadways or boulevards and to 
exercise such rights and powers in regard to them as counties, cities, 
or towns have over public ways under their control. General Laws, 
Chapter 92, Section 36, makes the Commonwealth liable "for injuries 
sustained by persons while traveling on any boulevard maintained by 
the commission ... if the same are caused by defects within the limit 
of the constructed traveled roadway." No liability is to accrue, how-
ever, "for injuries resulting from the absence of a railing or on the 
sidewalk or during construction, reconstruction, or repair of a boule-
vard." 
Longo v. Metropolitan District Commission4 was an action to re-
cover for injuries incurred by a pedestrian crossing Revere Beach 
Parkway who alleged his injuries were caused by "a defect on ... the 
center island . . . consisting of an iron rod protruding from the 
ground." On appeal from an order dismissing the action, the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that Section 36 "is broad enough to impose lia-
bility for injuries to pedestrians caused by defects in those portions of 
such safety and similar islands or strips which are within the outer 
limits of the traveled part of the boulevard and reasonably adapted to 
pedestrian use."1i 
While the Court ruled that the petition was not, on its face, demur-
rable, its opinion (written by Mr. Justice Cutter) makes it clear that the 
plaintiff, in order to prevail, must show that the place of his injury 
was both "appropriate for use by pedestrians reasonably crossing a 
boulevard" and "in fact a part of the traveled roadway."6 This may 
be difficult, even under the Court's liberal definition of "traveled." 
§5.7. Dangerous activity. Three cases during the 1965 SURVEY 
year emphasize the high duty of care imposed upon a person engaged 
in a dangerous activity or having control of a dangerous instrumen-
tality. 
Toppin v. Buzzards Bay Gas CO.l involved a gas explosion which 
damaged a summer home owned by the plaintiffs. The defendant, 
which supplied gas to the house, undertook to make adjustments on 
the furnace, gas heater, and other appliances and to tum the gas off 
in the fall and on in the spring. Gas leakage from a corroded gas line 
caused an explosion the day that gas was turned on for the 1960 
8Id. at 7, 203 N.E.2d at 696. 
41964 Mass. Adv. Sh. U33,202 N.E.2d 796. 
Ii Id. at 1335, 202 N.E.2d at 798. 
6 Ibid. 
§5.7. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 131, 204 N.E.2d 120. 
8
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season. An auditor found that the defendant, which had earlier been 
infonned of gas odors, was negligent in not testing the lines when 
turning on the service. The Supreme Judicial Court, affinning a 
judgment entered on the report, rejected the defendant's argument 
that the auditor could not make such a finding without expert testi-
mony on the standard of care to be expected of the defendant. 
In the light of his general knowledge of practical affairs [the 
auditor] could reasonably infer that testing or inspection of gas 
lines in the case at bar would have eliminated the danger of an 
explosion due to escaping gas and that the exercise of reasonable 
skill and judgment required such a course of action by the de-
fendant.2 
The highly explosive quality of gas was sufficiently well known to 
require no expert testimony.s 
A similar high standard of care was imposed upon an electrician 
in Kilduff v. Plymouth County Electric CO.4 Repairing a broken line, 
he pennitted the energized section of a 2400-volt line to slip from his 
hands. It struck the common neutral line on the pole bar below, 
starting a fire which destroyed the plaintiff's house. While recognizing 
that the lineman was working under adverse weather conditions, 
the Court nevertheless ruled that "he was working with a highly 
dangerous force which called for adequate precautions on the part of 
the defendants."1S 
The owner of a building which collapsed after it had been con-
demned as a common nuisance was held liable for the death and injury 
of certain passersby on the sidewalk who were struck by parts of the 
falling building, notwithstanding a lease of the premises or the hiring 
of independent contractors to do the repair work.6 
§5.8. Joint tortfeasors: Loan against recovery. Crocker v. New 
England Power CO.l presented, as a matter of first impression, the 
legal effect of a loan receipt signed by the plaintiff when paid a sum 
of money by the insurer of one of two defendants in a tort action. 
The payment was characterized as a loan repayable out of the pro-
ceeds of any recovery on any claims of the plaintiff arising out of 
the accident and the insurer attorney was, in fact, appointed to con-
duct any further proceedings to recover damages. The codefendant 
argued that this constituted a release. The Court, however, gave effect 
to the parties' expressed intentions, calling the result a desirable one. 
2Id. at 134·135, 204 N.E.2d at 122. 
SBrennan v. Arlington Gas Light Co., 341 Mass. 679, 171 N.E.2d 838 (1961); 
Stewart v. Worcester Gas Light Co., 341 Mass. 425, 170 N.E.2d 330 (1960); see Friese 
v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co., 324 Mass. 623, 88 N.E.2d 1 (1949). 
4 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 51, 203 N.E.2d 679. 
IS Id. at 53, 203 N.E.2d at 680. 
6 Baldassare v. Crown Furniture Co., 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 759, 207 N.E.2d 268. 
See further comment in §2.6 supra. 
§5.8. 11964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1313, 202 N.E.2d 793. 
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"The injured plaintiff, who is allowed funds while his claim is being 
litigated, is saved from becoming a victim of the law's delays."2 It 
was also noted that the rule against contribution among joint tort-
feasors no longer prevails,3 and there is no merit to any policy argu-
ment denouncing the parties' action as an evasion of the rule. 
§5.9. Unfair competition. The Massachusetts rule that the mere 
copying and sale of an unpatented product furnishes no right to in-
junctive relief or damages in favor of the originator1 was established 
long before the United States Supreme Court made it a rule required 
by the supremacy clause and the limitation of protection afforded by 
the patent laws.2 Angell Elevator Lock Co. v. Manning3 reaffirmed 
that rule. The defendant, a former employee of the plaintiff, had, 
after being "laid off," begun to make an elevator lubricator identical 
to that of the plaintiff in competition with the plaintiff. Reversing a 
Superior Court decree in favor of the plaintiff, the Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled that, in the absence of any agreement not to compete or 
of a "palming off" of the defendant's goods as the goods of the plaintiff, 
no unfair competition had been established. 
In Lufkin'S Real Estate, Inc. v. Aseph,4 there was a covenant against 
the employee's engaging in the business of a real estate broker for one 
year after leaving the employ of the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought an 
injunction and damages. It showed that the defendant had made a 
sale in violation of his agreement and received a commission of $700.00. 
The Superior Court entered a decree ordering the defendant to pay 
the plaintiff $700.00. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed. 
Since there was no basis in the record for a finding that the sale in 
question would have gone to the plaintiff but for the defendant's 
breach, there was no showing that the plaintiff had been damaged 
and the bill was dismissed. 
The other unfair competition cases all involved the so-called "Massa-
chusetts dilution statute."5 In The Great Scott Food Market, Inc. v. 
Sunderland Wonder, Inc.,6 the defendant was enjoined from using 
the trade name "Big G" in its five-store supermarket chain in the 
Worcester area because the plaintiff had already adopted the name 
2Id. at 1315, 202 N.E.2d at 795. 
3 See G.L., c. 231B, added by Acts of 1962, c. 730. 
§5.9. 1 Barrett v. Goodwin, 314 Mass. 279, 50 N.E.2d 9 (1943); Flagg Manufactur· 
ing Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, 59 N.E. 667 (1901). 
2Sears, Roebuck &: Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225, 86 Sup. Ct. 784, 11 L. Ed. 2d 661 
(1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 84 Sup. Ct. 779, 11 
L. Ed. 2d 669 (1964); see the discussion in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.9. 
31965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 387, 205 N.E.2d 245. 
4 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 939, 208 N.E.2d 209. 
5 G.L., c. 100, §7A, provides: "Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of 
dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trademark shall be a ground 
for injunctive relief in cases of trademark infringement or unfair competition, not-
withstanding the absence of competition between the parties or of confusion as to 
the source of goods or services." 
61965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 41, 203 N.E.2d 376. 
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for use in the Fall River area in a supermarket-discount store type of 
operation. The absence of any actual competition between the parties 
was held immaterial under the statute.7 
A right of action under General Laws, Chapter llO, Section 7A, was 
found, even though the plaintiff's registration under the Lanham ActS 
was declared invalid, in Blanchard &- Co. v. Charles Gilman &- Son, 
Inc.9 Judge Caffrey found: 
The similarity between the trademarks used by plaintiffs and the 
trademarks used by defendants is so great that the beverage-con-
suming and retail purchasing public are likely to be confused, 
mistaken, and deceived as to whether they are buying plaintiffs' 
products on the one hand or whether they are buying products 
of the defendants on the other hand.10 
By far the most unusual case was Tiffany &- Co. v. Boston Club, 
Inc.,11 involving the use of the word "Tiffany." Although the parties 
were not even in indirect competition with each other and, in fact, 
were in wholly different lines of business (the plaintiff operating the 
world-famous jewelry store in New York, the defendant, a restaurant 
in Boston), Judge Caffrey ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to the 
protection of both General Laws, Chapter llO, Section 7A, and the 
Lanham Act.12 He found that the defendant "deliberately pirated 
plaintiff's good name in an attempt to poach upon the commercial 
magnetism of the sterling trade name developed over the years by 
plaintiff."13 
In finding that the defendant had deliberately chosen the plaintiffs 
name for the purpose of cashing in on plaintiff's name and reputation, 
the judge distinguished such cases as Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper 
Mfg. CO.,14 as involving a trader who "has plucked a word 'with favor-
able connotations for his goods or services out of the general vocabu-
lary and appropriated it to his exclusive use: " and classified the case 
as falling within the class of cases such as Jay's Inc. v. Jay-Originals, 
Inc.11i The latter case, however, involved, as did the Monroe case,16 a 
trademark infringement between two noncompetitors in the same 
business. So far as appears, Tiffany represents the first time that the 
Massachusetts statute has been invoked in the case of two businesses 
in distinctly different lines. 
The Food Fair case17 is back in the courts again. In one of the 
7 Monroe Stationers Be Printers, Inc. v. Munroe Stationers, Inc., 332 Mass. 278, 124 
N.E.2d 526 (1955). 
S 60 Stat. 930 (1946), 64 Stat. 459 (1950), 76 Stat. 770 (1962), 15 U.S.C. §1057 (1964). 
9239 F. Supp. 827 (D. Mass. 1965). 
10Id. at 831. 
11 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964). 
1260 Stat. 437 (1946), 76 Stat. 773 (1962), 15 U.S.C. §1ll4(1) (1964). 
13231 F. Supp. 836, 845 (D. Mass. 1964). 
14243 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1957). 
111 321 Mass. 737, 75 N.E.2d 514 (1947). 
16 Note 7 supra. 
17 See Food Fair Stores v. Food Fair, 83 F. Supp. 445 (D. Mass. 1948), aD'd, 177 
F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949). 
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earliest cases brought under General Laws, Chapter no, Section 7A, 
a multistate supermarket chain operating in some fifteen states east of 
the Mississippi (but not in Massachusetts) sought to enjoin the opera-
tor of several Boston area supermarkets from using the word "Food 
Fair" as its trade name. The Court of Appeals, affirming a judgment 
entered by Judge Wyzanski, permitted the local operator to use the 
name, provided he added a distinguishing prefix to differentiate his 
stores from those of the larger chain. It chose the word "New England," 
and, since 1949, has continued to operate as the "New England Food 
Fair."18 In 1962, however, it brought a new action against the larger 
chain (plaintiffs in the first case) to enjoin it from entering the Massa-
chusetts area under the name "Food Fair." By counterclaim, the 
defendant sought the same relief it had sought as plaintiff fifteen years 
earlier. Pointing out that the earlier decree gave the plaintiff "the 
limited chance to limp in the competitive race with the name 'Food 
Fair,' if, but only if, there were added a distinguishing prefix to avoid 
conflict or confusion ... ,"19 Judge Wyzanski found that the name, or 
the variation of it, used by each of the parties, had acquired a secon-
dary meaning in the area of its operations. He also found that the 
defendant, but not the plaintiff, had both the willingness and the 
ability to expand into western Massachusetts, and concluded that 
"Ancient error is often a sound basis for a good present title,"20 and 
dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaim. The controversy 
has not yet run its course, a notice of appeal having been filed. 
§5.10. Release. In order to gain admission to the "pit area" at 
an auto race track, a racing fan "joined" the Atlantic Auto Racing 
Association and signed a document releasing the association and the 
track from any and all liability for injury to him resulting from the 
race. He was injured when a wheel flew off a speeding car, climbed 
the fence behind which he was standing, and fell on top of him. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the release which he signed barred 
any recovery against the parties named in the release.1 Before the 
Court, the plaintiff attempted to bring the facts of the case within the 
so-called "baggage check" or "parking ticket" cases,2 claiming that no 
one had brought his attention to the printed language on the docu-
ment which he signed. The Court, however, distinguished the claim 
check cases and held that "The signing of the paper to gain the right 
of admission ... presents a different situation."3 
The distinction between a document which one signs and a ticket 
which is handed a bailor by a bailee in exchange for bailed property 
18 Food Center, Inc. v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 785, 786 (D. Mass. 1965). 
19 Id. at 786. 
20 Id. at 787. 
§5.l0. 1 Lee v. Allied Sports Associates, Inc., 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1195, 209 N.E.2d 
S29. 
2 Kergald v. Armstrong Transfer Express Co., SSO Mass. 254, lIS N.E.2d 5S (1953); 
Sandler v. Commonwealth Station Co., S07 Mass. 470, 30 N.E.2d S89 (1940). For a 
discussion of the general problem see 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§14.5; 18.1; 18.3. 
81965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1195, 1200, 209 N.E.2d S29, S32. 
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should, of course, be obvious. While, in the latter cases, the bailor may 
reasonably suppose that he is receiving nothing more than a means of 
identifying his property, the plaintiff had a duty to himself to be aware 
of the paper which he signed. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§5.11. Medical malpractice actions. In 1949 the legislature, rec-
ognizing the difficulty of obtaining expert testimony on behalf of a 
plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit, enacted General Laws, Chapter 
233, Section 79C,l permitting the admission in evidence of statements 
of fact or opinion contained in any published treatise, periodical, book, 
or pamphlet if the court finds that the statements are relevant, the 
writer recognized in his profession as an expert, and advance notice 
of intent to use the publication is given to the adverse party. The 
legislature amended the statute during the 1965 SURVEY year in 
three particulars: (a) it deleted the qualification giving the trial judge 
"discretion" to admit the evidence, if relevant; (b) it extended from 
three to thirty days before trial the time within which notice of in-
tention to use the publication must be given; and (c) it required the 
notice to contain the date of publication, name of publisher, and the 
page or pages on which the statements sought to be used appear.2 
§5.12. Snow and ice notices. The legislature extended from ten 
to thirty days the time for giving notice to a city, town, or county of 
injuries caused in part by snow or ice.l 
§5.13. Legislative rejects. The legislature again rejected such 
hardy perennials as would have: removed the immunity of a charity 
from liability in tort,l established a rule of comparative negligence in 
lieu of the common law defense of contributory negligence,2 estab-
lished the "attractive nuisance" doctrine as law,a increased the speed 
limits on all highways,4 and imposed vicarious liability on parents and 
others for the tortious acts of minor children./i 
The legislature also rejected two resolves to create special commis-
sions to study the creation of an uninsured accident fund6 and an 
Automobile Accident Commission patterned after the Industrial 
Accident Board.7 
§5.11. 1 Acts of 1949, c. 183, §1. 
2 Acts of 1965, c. 425. 
§5.I2. 1 Acts of 1965, c. 378, amending G.L., c. 84, §§18, 19, 21. 
§5.I3. 1 House Doc. Nos. 527, 535, 1959 (1965). 
2 House Doc. No. 963 (1965). 
a House Doc. Nos. 3549, 3602 (1965). 
4 House Doc. No. 2312 (1965). 
/i House Doc. No. 3823 (1965). 
6 House Doc. No. 3753 (1965). 
7 House Doc. No. 1565 (1965). 
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§5.14. Uninsured motorists. A bill to create a motor vehicle acci-
dent indemnification corporationl for the indemnification of persons 
injured or killed by "financially irresponsible motorists" was referred 
to a study commission.2 
§5.14. 1 House Doc. No. 3471 (1965). 
2 House Order No. 4012 (1965). 
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